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Although Dewey's influence has remained strong 
amongst the community of educators, his reputation amongst 
philosophers has had a remarkably volatile history. He was 
unquestionably the most influential figure in American 
philosophy until his death in 1952. Almost immediately after 
his death, however, Dewey's writings almost completely dis-
appeared from the American philosophy syllabus. They were 
replaced by the analytic philosophers of the logical positivist 
tradition, who thought that philosophical problems could be 
solved by unraveling puzzles that came from a lack of under-
standing of proper language use. After several decades, 
however, the inadequacies of this view became unavoidably 
obvious, and the next generation of analytically trained 
philosophers began to find themselves saying things that 
sounded remarkably like Dewey. Many analytic philosophers 
began to use the word "pragmatist" to describe some aspect 
of their positions: Quine, Churchland, Davidson, Feyerabend, 
Rorty, Putnam, among many others. Putnam and Rorty, in 
particular, have made a serious effort to restudy the original 
pragmatist texts, and reinterpret them for use in modern con-
texts. Not everyone is satisfied with their reinterpretations, 
however. Rorty, in particular has been criticized in some de-
tail by Dewey scholars (see especially Saatkamp, 1995). But 
Rorty admits that his ideas differ significantly from Dewey's, 
because he is trying to revive only those aspects of Dewey's 
ideas which are relevant for our times. I will argue, however, 
that those aspects of pragmatism which Rorty claims are the 
most relevant are actually the most out of date, and vice versa. 
The pragmatists were caught between two different philo-
sophical movements and were equally critical of both. On 
the one hand, they were reacting against nineteenth century 
idealist philosophy, which often got hung up in metaphysical 
disputes that had no possibility of being resolved. But on the 
other hand, they were equally critical of the positivist's 
belief that it was possible to not do metaphysics. Nineteenth 
century idealist philosophy is a dead horse in the twenty-first 
century, and thus the pragmatist's arguments against it are of 
relatively little use today. But analytic philosophy has lived 
under the spell of positivism for over a half a century, and 
still has not figured out what should go in its place. Rorty 
captures this dilemma quite well when he refers to philoso-
phers like Quine, Sellars and Davidson as "post-analytic 
philosophers." The pragmatist alternative to positivism is an 
alternative which many of these post-analytic philosophers 
have been drifting towards. But as long as we assume that 
the pragmatist's contributions to metaphysics and epistemol-
ogy should be ignored, I believe that we will not be able to 
free ourselves from the last reverberations of the positivist 
hangover. 
In this paper, I will examine some of the modern debates 
between pragmatism and so-called "realism," especially those 
between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. My claim is that 
many of these debates are based on misunderstandings of the 
pragmatist tradition. If we rely on Dewey's original ideas, 
rather than Rorty 's reinterpretations of Dewey, these 
problems can be radically transformed, and in many cases 
dissolved. 
The Rorty-Putnam Debate 
In the debate between pragmatists and realists, Rorty is 
currently seen as the most adamant spokesman for pragma-
tism. Putnam is seen as slightly to the "epistemological right" 
of Rorty, because although he speaks highly of pragmatism, 
he considers his position to be less pragmatist, and more 
realist, than Rorty's. This balance between pragmatism and 
realism is nicely expressed in the title of Putnam's book 
"Realism with a Human Face." This title is not just an 
historical reference to Czechoslovakian socialism. Putnam's 
realism acknowledges that knowledge is always from a 
human's, never a God's eye, view. Reality, in other words, 
necessarily has a human face, for it makes no sense for us to 
talk about a reality which is completely independent of our 
human lives and activities. However, Putnam differentiates 
himself from Rorty by saying that he, unlike Rorty, believes 
that there is a reality which exists independently of our be-
liefs about it. Putnam argues that we cannot avoid claiming 
that some beliefs are warranted (i.e., justified, in some sense), 
and others are not, and that this distinction only makes sense 
if we accept that reality is somehow independent of our 
beliefs about it. 
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Putnam's main argument is that Rorty's position contra-
dicts itself, and other concepts that runs so deeply in us that 
we cannot possibly think without them (see Putnam, 1990, 
pp. 21-24). We cannot say that a warranted belief is merely 
what most people believe, because this contradicts the very 
idea of warrant itself. To say that a belief is warranted must 
mean that one should believe it regardless of whether anyone 
else does. Similarly he says that "it is internal to our picture 
of reform that whether the outcome of a change is good (a 
reform) or bad (its opposite) is logically independent of 
whether it seems good or bad" (p. 24). Putnam admits that 
the fact that we find it impossible to think without a concept 
does not in itself prove that the concept is valid. But Rorty is 
apparently saying that we should reject traditional realism 
because it is a bad theory, even though the majority of people 
currently believe it. And once he makes this move, Putnam 
claims that he contradicts himself "what can 'bad' possibly 
mean here but 'based on a wrong metaphysical picture'" 
(P- 22)? 
I think that Putnam is right that there are conceptual 
incoherencies in Rorty's arguments, and that some of them 
do involve the old logical positivist error of formulating a 
metaphysics/epistemology that denies it is a metaphysics/ 
epistemology. One of the things I will be doing in this paper 
is providing more detailed arguments to support Putnam's 
claim that "Just saying 'that's a pseudo-issue' is not of itself 
therapeutic; it is an aggressive form of the metaphysical dis-
ease itself' (ibid., p. 20). But I will also be making two other 
claims, one of which supports Putnam against Rorty, and the 
other of which criticizes both Putnam and Rorty almost 
equally. 
The first of these claims is that Rorty is guilty of another 
incoherency besides contradiction: he is using arguments 
which do not actually support the position he claims they 
support. Unlike many of Rorty's Critics, Putnam and I both 
believe that most Rorty's more controversial premises are 
true. But I will argue that the inferences from those premises 
that supposedly lead to Rorty's conclusions are actually 
invalid. His main argument for the abandonment of the 
questions of epistemology is that a certain answer to these 
questions has been shown to be unsatisfactory. But it does 
not follow from this fact that therefore epistemology itself 
should be abandoned. For if Rorty is only critiquing particu-
lar answers to epistemological questions, this has no impact 
on the validity of the epistemological enterprise itself. 
My second claim is that both Putnam and Rorty are 
equally mistaken in claiming that the most important thing 
we can learn from pragmatist philosophy is how to cure "the 
metaphysical disease." On the contrary, I think that the big-
gest need in modern analytical philosophy is learning how to 
cure the anti-metaphvsical disease, which made its first ap-
pearance in the Critique of Pure Reason, and had its most 
extreme form in the logical positivists and in both the early 
and late Wittgenstein. Rorty's so-called pragmatism is actu-
ally the last gasp of this anti-metaphysical disease, and I 
believe that the epistemological and metaphysical writings 
of James and Dewey could offer something like a cure for it. 
Even the late Wittgenstein believed that the purpose of 
philosophizing was to show how to get the fly out of the fly-
bottle which is metaphysical/epistemological paradox, and 
Rorty is still struggling to get out of that fly bottle. James and 
Dewey believed that we could never get out of the fly bottle 
and therefore we must learn how to struggle with the meta-
physical/epistemological questions as best we can. 
Putnam does recognize that to some degree these philo-
sophical questions are unavoidable, but he sees this as a real-
ist position that makes him less of a pragmatist. The reason 
he calls his position "realism with a small r" is that he 
accepts that "the enterprises of providing a foundation for 
being and knowledge.. . are enterprises that have disastrously 
failed" (Putnam, 1990, p. 19). But he considers it to be real-
ist, and not pragmatist, to say that that 'reconstructive reflec-
tion does not lose its value just because the dream of a total 
and unique reconstruction of our system of belief is hope-
lessly Utopian' (ibid., p. 25) and "the illusions that philoso-
phy spins are illusions that belong to the nature of human life 
itself (ibid., p. 20). In fact, the original pragmatists would 
actually have agreed with the first of these quotes, and dis-
agreed with the second only in a certain sense. They believed 
that human life requires us to accept some sort of philosophi-
cal 'illusion,' but they did not believe that it was impossible 
to escape the particular philosophical positions that have 
shaped our thinking so far. They thought that reconstructive 
reflection could produce new philosophical assumptions 
which would make us more at home in the world, and lead us 
into fewer errors, than the ones we have now, even if those 
philosophical assumptions were not "the truth" in the realist 
sense. They were, in other words, "philosophical revision-
ists" in the sense that Putnam says he is not (ibid., p. 20).[1] 
One is not likely to see this if one uses Rorty as one's 
main source for pragmatist insights, for he refers to books 
like James' "Essays in Radical Empiricism" and Dewey's 
"Experience and Nature," as "pretty useless, to my mind" 
(Rorty, 1994, p. 320n). These books contain some of the best 
expressions of pragmatist metaphysics and epistemology, and 
ignoring them is to lose an essential part of the pragmatist 
worldview. When we take a close look at Rorty's critiques of 
the epistemological enterprise, we can see that he simply 
ignores pragmatist epistemology, and thus closes off what is 
perhaps the most fruitful new perspective on the subject. This 
is why he assumes that once he has disposed of the pre-
pragmatist answers to the metaphysical questions, he has 
disposed of the questions themselves. This is also why he is 
unable to see that he himself is still hanging on to highly 
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questionable epistemological assumptions, which he himself 
cannot question because he refuses to explicitly think about 
epistemology. 
On Confusing the Question with the Answer 
Reading Rorty often gives a sense that philosophy is an 
enterprise which has come to the end of its tether, whose only 
task left is to find a way of committing suicide in the most 
dignified manner possible. We must refrain from argument, 
he says, and content ourselves with only having conversa-
tions. We must avoid trying to answer any of the questions 
that have concerned philosophers, or even trying to prove 
that they cannot be answered. And we must refrain from try-
ing to change our fundamental beliefs about reality, or from 
searching for justifications for keeping them. I think, how-
ever, that most of this doom and gloom comes from a single 
mistake: Rorty's claim that doing epistemology is not asking 
a kind of question, but giving a kind of answer, and/or claim-
ing that it is possible for those answers to be apodicticly 
certain. To some degree, Rorty is aware that he is doing this, 
which is why it is hard to tell exactly what he is saying we 
should stop doing, and why we should stop doing it. He says 
that no one would deny that we can always ask Sellars' ques-
tion "how things in the broadest possible sense of the term 
hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term." He 
calls this philosophy, and contrasts it with Philosophy (with 
a capital "P"). When he talks about the differences between 
these two, however, it looks like he is defining Capital-P 
Philosophy not by the questions it asks, but by the answers it 
gives. And if he is only critiquing particular answers to epis-
temological questions, this has no impact on the validity of 
the epistemological enterprise itself. 
For example, Rorty says that one of the characteristics 
of Philosophy is the hope that we can "believe more truths or 
do more good or be more rational by knowing more about 
Truth or Goodness or Rationality" (Rorty, 1982, p. xvi). He 
claims that even Anti-Platonists like Hobbes and the logical 
positivists practiced Philosophy in this sense, because they 
still believed that "the assemblage of true statements should 
be thought of as divided into a lower and an upper division, 
the division between (in Plato's terms) mere opinion and genu-
ine knowledge" (ibid.). He calls all thought that presupposes 
the belief that there is such a division "epistemology," and 
says that once we have given up the possibility of finding 
something that all true sentences have in common, we have 
changed the subject, and are no longer doing epistemology. 
Rorty is correct when he says that most epistemologists 
have agreed on this point, even when they have disagreed 
about everything else. But because I don't agree with this 
point myself, this sentence sounds to me like "You are not 
really an astronomer if you are not trying to find out what 
turns the crystal spheres." I believe that there is a continuum, 
not a line, between this lower and upper division, and that 
true statements are related to each other by family resem-
blance, not by all possessing a single set of essential proper-
ties. I could be wrong about either or both of these points, but 
I am clearly making an epistemological claim when I say 
them, and anyone who has a conversation with me about this 
subject will be making other epistemological claims. If I try 
to articulate the various activities and qualities that various 
true statements have (for example, if I say that true state-
ments are always useful) what I am doing is epistemology. If 
I say that the sole essential property of true statements is that 
they are all useful, and therefore demand that no more be 
said about the subject, I am also doing epistemology. 
This last position is ironically more essentialist than the 
positions of those of us who want to continue talking about 
epistemology, for it asserts that all true statements have this 
one property of usefulness and no other. If we assume that 
true statements are related by family resemblance, rather than 
by a set of essential properties, then the epistemologist's task 
would be to create a list of characteristics that are often shared 
by many true statements, and then try to understand which 
ones are likely to cluster together, and which ones are mutu-
ally exclusive. This assumption would not require us to give 
up talking about truth altogether. The fact that Aristotle did 
not believe that there is a single essence that all good things 
have in common did not stop him from writing ethics. For 
that matter, it is now widely believed that the categories that 
we use to classify plants and animals into species are family 
resemblances, yet no one who believes this thinks that we 
should therefore refrain from doing botany and zoology (see 
Dupre, 1993 and Lakoff, 1987). [2] 
When we look at what Rorty says about the relationship 
between epistemology and empirical psychology in 'Philoso-
phy and the Mirror of Nature,' we can see that he makes simi-
lar mistakes in most of his arguments. In the chapter titled 
"Epistemology and Empirical Psychology" (Rorty, 1979, 
pp. 213-256), Rorty says that naturalized epistemology can-
not "aid in maintaining the image of philosophy as a disci-
pline which stands apart from empirical inquiry" (p. 220). 
But why should it, and why should this be a problem for epis-
temology so serious that it would require us to abandon it 
altogether? I think Rorty sees the problem as being that the 
sciences do have specialized domains and that if philosophy 
doesn't have one it must not be a legitimate enterprise (hence 
his frequent use of the pejorative "dilettante" to describe the 
condition of the modern philosopher). But the creation of 
cognitive science shows that at least some scientists have now 
learned that all disciplines are separated from each other only 
by differences in degree. Yet no one says we should stop do-
ing linguistics or neuroscience because neither one will be 
able to fully understand language without consulting the other. 
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If we accept (as I think Rorty does) that the exact divisions 
between all scientific specialties are decided by social con-
vention rather than by where nature has placed carvable joints, 
why is there any problem with the fact that the specialized 
borders of philosophy are drawn vertically (by levels of 
abstraction) rather than horizontally (by subject matter)? This 
is basically the point that Haack makes when she says that 
"giving up the idea that philosophy is distinguished by its a 
priori character encourages a picture of philosophy as con-
tinuous with science. . .but this does not oblige one to deny 
that there is a difference in degree between science and 
philosophy" (Haack, 1993, p. 188). [3] 
In another section of Rorty 1979 entitled 'Epistemologi-
cal Behaviorism,' Rorty claims that "Epistemological behav-
iorism. . . has nothing to do with Watson or with Ryle" 
(p. 176). The reason is that "We can take the Sellars-Quine 
attitude towards knowledge while cheerfully 'countenancing' 
raw feels, a priori concepts, innate ideas, sense data, proposi-
tions, and anything else which a causal explanation of 
human behavior might find it helpful to postulate" (p. 177). 
It is difficult to square Rorty's acceptance of "lush metaphysi-
cal landscapes" (ibid.) with his continual assertions that he 
wants there to be no alternative to epistemology, only a change 
of subject. The above list contains essentially every theoreti-
cal term discussed in the history of epistemology. What then 
does Rorty mean when he says that we should not do episte-
mology? "Behaviorism in epistemology is a matter not of 
metaphysical parsimony, but whether authority can attach to 
assertions by virtue of relations of 'acquaintance'. . ." (ibid.). 
Rorty claims, in other words, that all epistemologies must 
accept that knowledge has foundations, or they are not wor-
thy of the name. But although this is certainly a popular epis-
temological position, it is not the only possible position on 
this issue. No one would claim that to say dinosaurs are rep-
tiles is doing paleontology, but to say they are birds is not to 
do paleontology. Two different answers to the same question 
are talking about the same subject, even (perhaps especially) 
if they say different things about that subject. 
Rorty's Reactionary Positivism 
Rorty is not merely changing the subject the way he 
would be if he interrupted an epistemological discussion by 
saying "how about those Niners!!" He is not content to sim-
ply stop talking about epistemology, he wants to assert that 
there is something wrong about continuing to do so, and some-
thing right about stopping. And any such assertion contains 
(at least dimly) some presuppositions about this activity that 
should be stopped, or it would make no sense. Rorty almost 
acknowledges this when he describes what he now does by 
saying things like "hermeneutics is always parasitic upon the 
possibility (and perhaps upon the actuality) of epistemology" 
(Rorty, 1979, p. 366) and "edifying philosophers have to de-
cry the very notion of having a view, while avoiding having a 
view about having views" (ibid., p. 371) After the second 
quote, Rorty adds "this is an awkward, but not impossible 
position." But impossible is precisely the right word for this 
position, for it contains essentially the same contradiction as 
the Logical Positivist claim that "all non-empirical, non-
tautologous statements are meaningless, except for this one." 
Because there are so many contradictions in Rorty's 
attempt to shut down epistemology, I think we ought to take 
him at his word the one time he denies allegiance to meta-
physical parsimony, and ignore the numerous times he en-
dorses it. He should then be willing to add a few caveats about 
fallibilism to the beginning of "Experience and Nature," and 
then accept it (and other works of epistemology) as manifes-
tations of a valid enterprise (i.e., worth criticizing, rather than 
merely dismissing with a change of subject). To some de-
gree, my recommendation is the mirror image of Rorty's 
analysis of Dewey in his "Dewey between Hegel and Dar-
win." The pragmatists were, as Rorty points out in this essay, 
highly ambivalent about the epistemological enterprise. 
James and Dewey, alas, never made up their minds whether 
they wanted just to forget about epistemology or whether they 
wanted to devise a new improved epistemology of their own. 
In my view they should have opted for forgetting, (pp. 59-60) 
What I am claiming is that Rorty has made a similar 
equivocation, and that in my view he should opt for devising 
a new improved epistemology. Rorty is already making epis-
temological assumptions when he asserts that epistemologi-
cal questions have no answers, or that it is possible to change 
the subject when epistemological questions come up, or that 
the only possible answer to "what is truth" is "whatever is set 
by social practices." His attempt to be operationalist and posi-
tivistic about epistemology fails for the same basic reason 
that Skinner's behaviorism and Carnap's positivism fails: we 
cannot assume that we are not making theoretical assump-
tions simply because we have stopped deliberately theoriz-
ing. In Rorty 1982, he remarks that many people think of 
pragmatism as being just a namby-pamby sort of positivism. 
What I am arguing is that to some degree, Rorty's pragma-
tism really is just a namby-pamby sort of positivism. Part of 
what makes it namby-pamby is that it is not supported by the 
dogmatic scientism of the positivists. This makes Rorty far 
more tolerant of alternative world-views than the positivists 
ever were, which is a virtue I admire. But without the foun-
dation of sense data that made positivism a form of realism, 
Rorty's anti-metaphysical bias collapses into a kind of 
subjective idealism. 
In fact, if I were to come up with a single phrase to 
describe Rorty's epistemology, I would call it "Idealism in 
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denial." This is most obvious when he says things like this: 
Epistemological Behaviorism. . . can best be seen as a 
species of holism-but one that requires no idealist meta-
physical underpinnings. (Rorty, 1979, p. 174) 
To retain the idealist's holism while junking their meta-
physics, all we need to do is to renounce the ambition of 
transcendence. (Rorty, 1993, p. 190) 
Unfortunately, once we have accepted holism, transcen-
dence is no longer an ambition, it is a duty and a curse. 
Holism accepts that all entities from gods to physical objects 
presuppose a reference to transcendent assumptions, even if 
those assumptions are not universal and apodictic. We can't 
escape this by saying that if we had opinions on this subject 
we would be idealists, and then coyly add that of course we 
don't have such opinions. We may, however, be able to 
escape idealism if we can formulate an alternative to it, and 
this is what Dewey and James were trying to do in 'Experi-
ence and Nature' and 'Essays in Radical Empiricism' respec-
tively. Despite what Rorty and the positivists believe, the only 
cure for epistemology is more epistemology. 
Pragmatism and Epistemology 
How then should we do epistemology from a pragmatist 
perspective? Part of the answer, I believe must be found by 
philosophizing about philosophy itself. This is not just a matter 
of justifying our profession to our peers in order to increase 
respect and grants. The relationship between fact and theory, 
the concrete and the abstract, is one of the central questions 
of epistemology. Our philosophy of knowledge is certainly 
incomplete if we don't understand the relationship between 
philosophy, (which—arguably—tries to be the most abstract 
discipline of all), and other more concrete branches of knowl-
edge. And I believe that a genuinely pragmatist view of phi-
losophy will ultimately grant a measure of epistemic virtue 
to the philosophy that preceded it, just as it grants epistemic 
virtue to any system of thought that serves a human need. 
Because we must philosophize, for better or worse, phi-
losophers should give up trying to make fundamental changes 
in what they have been doing. They must instead try to get a 
better understanding of what they have been doing all along, 
so they can develop realistic criteria for distinguishing good 
philosophy from bad. Kant set very ambitious goals for him-
self, and in terms of those goals he was a failure. And yet (I 
can't help saying this with a Yiddish accent) "We aH should 
be such failures." Kant clearly succeeded at something, and 
was more successful at it than any undergraduate term paper 
or Ph.D. thesis written on the same topics. And yet we as 
philosophers do not have any way of expressing what it was 
that Kant succeeded in doing. This is why we continue to 
flagellate ourselves, thinking the way to self-improvement is 
to continue to try to do less. Rorty's attempted dismissal of 
epistemology is, I hope, the last gasp of this futile and self-
destructive strategy, which was begun by Kant's Critiques 
and carried even further by the logical positivists. 
This does not mean that all metaphysical and epistemo-
logical writings are of equal value. There is no denying that 
many of the metaphysical excesses of certain debates in con-
temporary analytic philosophy are every bit as bad as those 
of nineteenth century philosophy. Putnam gives an example 
of such a debate between Quine, Lewis, and Kripke on 
p. 26-27 of Putnam 1990. I think that Putnam is correct in 
claiming that the best way of dealing with these kinds of 
excesses is to perform something like what James called cash-
value analysis. This is essentially what Putnam is doing when 
he considers whether there are any other significant implica-
tions to these claims, and when he decides that there are not, 
concludes that "No one, not even God {can answer such a 
question}.. . and not because there is something He doesn't 
know" (ibid.). But Dewey and James never asserted that all 
metaphysical claims lack cash value. On the contrary, they 
believed that all discourse presupposes some kind of meta-
physical claims, and that this was what made it possible for 
us to think rationally at all. 
How then does one identify philosophical claims which 
have cash value? No pragmatist would claim that there was a 
single necessary and sufficient definition which could answer 
that question. The bulk of my answer will be two very spe-
cific examples, one from Dewey's work and one from mod-
ern philosophy, which will hopefully make these principles 
clear. Before I become more specific, I must say something 
about the abstractions that those examples are meant to ex-
emplify. For the pragmatist view of the relationship between 
concreta and abstracta is very different from the traditional 
realist view. 
The Pragmatist View of the Relationship 
Between Knowledge and Human Activity 
Pragmatists claims that when language is used in human 
inquiry, the goal of the language user is to facilitate the 
achievement of the goals of other human activities. It does 
this by making abstract commitments about the entities 
encountered while performing those other activities. Because 
these commitments are abstract extrapolations from what is 
experienced, they make it possible for the inquirer to change 
that activity in radical and productive ways, sometimes so 
radically that it becomes necessary to give the changed 
activity a whole new name. This is probably why human 
beings are so much better at learning than any other animal. 
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Language enables us to take what we have learned through 
the experience of performing one kind of activity, and apply 
it to a completely different activity. It is the abstract nature of 
language which enables us to make use of one kind of expe-
rience in a variety of different contexts. 
However, the epistemic merit of these various abstrac-
tions is not determined by mere agreement within the com-
munity of language users. If one set of epistemological com-
mitments leads its believers into fewer and/or less dangerous 
errors than some other set, the former has greater epistemic 
merit. And this epistemic merit is an independent fact, which 
holds even if no one in the community of language users is 
aware of it. There are many reason why a community might 
decide to cling to a bad theory—stubbornness, fear, social 
prejudice against those who advance alternatives. But if one 
theory leads its believers into more serious errors than 
another possible competitor, that theory is epistemically 
inferior to its competitor even if the community remains in 
denial about these errors. This is why Rorty is wrong when 
he says that the only criterion by which we can evaluate our 
theories is agreement within the community. Note, however, 
that we do not have to posit a world that is independent of 
human activities in order to make this claim. We need only 
posit that there are human activities other than language, and 
that it is possible for language to prescribe courses of action 
which cause those activities to be (in varying degrees) either 
successful or unsuccessful on their own terms. The differ-
ence between 1) an epistemology which enables a practitio-
ner to obtain the goals of that practice and 2) an epistemol-
ogy which routinely leads a practitioner into errors, is a real 
and measurable cash value difference between the two epis-
temologies. And this difference does not disappear simply 
because a community has failed to notice it. 
Rorty's inability to make the distinction between genu-
ine cash value and community consensus is one more 
example of his affinity with positivism and estrangement from 
traditional pragmatism. Rorty admits that his pragmatism is 
one that "got a new lease on l i fe by undergoing 
linguistification" (Saatkamp, 1995, p. 70). This exclusive 
focus on language makes it impossible for Rorty to take seri-
ously any of Dewey's theories about the importance of activ-
ity and experience. This is why Rorty naturally tends to see 
language as a self-contained entity, with no other criterion 
for evaluation other than the agreement of the community in 
which the language is spoken. For Rorty, one of the conse-
quences of pragmatism is that there is no world that exists 
outside of our language. (And because Rorty believes that all 
thought is linguistic, this also means that there is no world 
that exists outside of our thought.) This is what he means 
when he refers to a "world well lost" in the title of chapter 2 
in Rorty 1982. This is why Rorty concludes that if there is a 
consensus that our language is accurate, it must be accurate. 
because supposedly there is no world outside of our language 
which the language is required to describe. 
Putnam, as I mentioned earlier, refuses to accept this 
position because he believes (I think correctly) that it is self-
contradictory. He therefore claims that we have no choice 
but to accept some form of realism. However, the third alter-
native I describe above is pragmatist, rather than realist, and 
can be extrapolated from one of Putnam's more famous apho-
risms. 'The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and 
the world' (Putnam, 1981, p. xi). 
Putnam is here proposing a concept of "world" which 
may seem counter intuitive at first, but there is justification 
for this usage in ordinary language (as well as in the writings 
of both Heidegger and Dewey). The word "World" does not 
always refer to something that is completely mind indepen-
dent. Every conscious organism has an interactive, symbi-
otic relationship with certain parts of its environment, which 
arises because of the goals and activities of that organism. 
When we speak of "the world of commerce" or "the world of 
football" we are not talking about some particular acreage of 
real estate. We are talking about a network of activities which 
establishes relationships amongst people, places, and things. 
If we take Putnam to mean "world" in this sense, we could 
interpret his slogan as implying the following three statements. 
1) These worlds obviously do not exist independently of the 
minds of the people who plan business deals and football 
strategies. 2) Yet these worlds are also not completely mind 
dependent—if people were only thinking about football, and 
not playing it on real football fields, the world of football as 
we know it would not exist. 3) I think Putnam would also 
accept that there is no thought without embodied activity in 
some sort of world (in agreement with Dewey and Heidegger, 
and in contradistinction to someone like Descartes). In other 
words, it would not be possible to think about football, or 
anything else, unless we had a world in which football and 
other activities could be performed. If we put all three of these 
claims together, we end up with the conclusion that the mind 
and the world jointly make up the mind and the world. 
What Putnam might not accept, and what Rorty and I do 
accept, is that these kinds of worlds are the only kinds of 
worlds that exist. There is no reason to believe that there is 
such a thing as a world-in-itself, independent of all of the 
thoughts, beliefs and activities of conscious beings. To be a 
pragmatist means to live and think with the metaphysical as-
sumption that such a world does not exist, and that it is a 
world well lost. Those who refuse to accept this kind of prag-
matism call themselves realists, but there is nothing realistic 
about their position if in fact the world-in-itself does not ex-
ist. Searle defends this kind of "realism" by distinguishing 
socially constructed reality (which for him includes the worlds 
described by biology, economics, and every other science 
except physics) from the world in itself (which is described 
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by physics). I believe, and I imagine that Rorty agrees with 
me, that this distinction is a completely unjustified privileg-
ing of the activities of physicists over the activities of every-
one else. I think Putnam would have almost as much prob-
lem with Searle's "realism" as Rorty and I would, but would 
want to claim that there is still some sort of world which is 
independent of human activity, even if the physicists are not 
the people who know what it is. But I think the only reason 
Putnam still clings to something like a "realist" world is that 
he cannot accept Rorty's claim that consensus among 
language users is the only thing that determines the nature of 
their world. Neither Rorty nor Putnam have considered the 
possibility that the world could be constituted by our activi-
ties, and still be distinct from what our language says about 
it, because language is not the only human activity. 
Barry Allen makes a similar criticism of Rorty when he 
accuses Rorty of having a propositional and discursive bias 
in his critique of epistemology. But despite Allen's undeni-
able comitment to pragmatism, there is an unnecessary 
acceptance of traditional realism in his claim that ". . . brute 
causality limits what we can make and do in ways which 
unfortunately can have surprisingly little to do with 'agree-
ments within a community about the consequences of a cer-
tain event'" (Brandom, 2000, p. 230). To some degree, the 
above paragraphs are a restatement of Allen's point, but with-
out the assumption of a brute causality impinging onto 
human experience from the so-called real word. If the suc-
cess and failure of non-verbal human activities is indepen-
dent of our beliefs about that success, there is no need to 
posit a non-human "brute causality" to account for errors made 
by the linguistic community. 
Dewey and Philosophical Questions 
with "Cash Value" 
Pragmatism claims that all human activity presupposes 
some kind of abstract theorizing, and abstract theorizing gets 
all of its meaning from it's ability to guide and effect some 
other human activity. Consequently, if you want to do phi-
losophy which has genuine cash value, you should find a 
human activity and analyze the philosophical presuppositions 
that govern it. Such an analysis can often reveal that these 
presuppositions cause errors, and suggest the possibility of 
other philosophical assumptions which might lead to fewer 
errors. 
Are there any concrete examples of human activities that 
have benefited from philosophical reflection or suffered be-
cause of the lack of it? I will end this paper by giving one 
example of each. First, contemporary cognitive science arose 
because psychologists discovered that a bad philosophical 
theory had caused stagnation and dogmatism in their 
discipline. This is why philosophers are now an active part of 
the cognitive science community. Second, this kind of analy-
sis is precisely what Dewey himself did throughout his long 
career. Almost all of his "non-philosophical" writings can be 
seen as a "cashing out" of his abstract concepts so that they 
could be applied to some concrete situations. And his analy-
sis had an undeniable impact on the practitioners of many 
different disciplines. One of the most dramatic and influen-
tial examples of this was when Dewey applied his pragmatist 
theory of knowledge to the theory of education. 
Philosophy and Cognitive Science 
When we look at contemporary cognitive science, there 
is a strong sense that those scientists who study the mind 
have decided that there is a need for philosophy to supple-
ment their work, and that contemporary philosophers are help-
ing to meet that need. This awareness has arisen because psy-
chologists experienced almost a half-century of behaviorist 
operationalism, and were acutely aware of the many prob-
lems that arise when one tries not to theorize. They had learned 
from bitter experience the inadequacies of the maxim "take 
care of the facts, and the theories will take care of themselves." 
They now realized that high level theorizing was a different 
skill from being able to design a good laboratory experiment, 
and that both skills were necessary to understanding their 
subject matter. Living through the history of mid-twentieth 
century philosophy of mind may incline us to share Rorty's 
sense that epistemological questions cannot be answered and/ 
or that what answers you choose make no pragmatic differ-
ence. But when we see how the epistemological presupposi-
tions of behaviorism misguided psychology, we can see that 
the epistemology you choose can make a great deal of differ-
ence indeed. We can also see that an epistemology that claims 
it is not an epistemology is a bad choice for purely pragmatic 
reasons. Laboratory psychologists have spent the last few 
decades cleaning up the wreckage left by the Skinnerian at-
tempts to be operationalist, and what they need now is a 
metatheory about how to theorize, not reiterations of the old 
puritanical demands to refrain from theorizing. (For concrete 
examples of how operationalism led psychology into errors, 
crisis, and finally into "The Cognitive Revolution," see Baars, 
1986). 
In the days of behaviorism and positivism, the goal of 
philosophers was to make philosophy a science, or at least as 
much like a science as possible. In contrast, at least some 
analytical philosophers in today's cognitive science commu-
nity have a sense that what they are doing is different from 
science and that this difference contributes to science's 
growth. I see several reasons for this change, mostly stem-
ming from the discovery that the kind of analysis that had 
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been applied to ordinary language could be done every bit as 
effectively on scientific language. This discovery stopped 
philosophy from dealing with the same examples and prob-
lems over and over again, and it gave philosophy the right to 
say new and profound things, because science is supposed to 
contradict common sense. No one would ever attempt to dis-
miss the expanding universe theory by saying "that is not 
what we mean by space." The Churchland's critique of folk 
psychology was especially revolutionary in this way; thanks 
to their arguments, common sense became something to be 
explained away, rather than the court of last appeal. This is 
essentially the same attitude that Heidegger has towards 
durchschnittlich (the average everyday), and which Dewey 
has to the prereflective activities that constitute human expe-
rience. Heidegger believes that fundamental ontology will 
provide the explanatory context that will transform everyday 
experience. Dewey and the Churchlands believe that it is sci-
ence (for the Churchlands, neuroscience) that will produce 
this transformation. But despite the numerous differences 
amongst their philosophies, the Churchlands, Dewey,and 
Heidegger all agree that it is essential for philosophers to come 
up with new theories about the nature of mind and the self, 
and to abandon the cautious modesty that prompted so many 
people to think of analytic philosophy as trivial. 
Quine realized (although he did not always stress it) that 
his talk about the need to naturalize epistemology also 
implied a need to epistemologize the natural sciences of mind. 
Although the philosopher has lost the right to prescribe a priori 
structures to the sciences, the scientist has also lost the right 
to think (as Skinner did) that it was possible to rely on a neu-
tral observation language and forget about philosophical 
speculations. This was an essential implication of Quine's 
claim that belief in objects was every bit as theoretical as 
belief in the gods of Homer. Philosophy and science are now 
adrift in the same boat, the philosopher without his old tran-
scendental foundations, and the scientist without his empiri-
cal foundations. When we keep all of this in mind, it seems 
that Rorty's Puritanism about philosophical abstraction is a 
quaint holdover from the days of the logical positivists, and 
inconsistent with his pragmatism. Because the logical posi-
tivists believed that each sentence was atomistic and needed 
no help from any other sentence, they could also believe that 
it was possible to throw away sentences above a certain level 
of abstraction and leave the concrete observation sentences 
intact. Pragmatism, however, (in the words of Susan Haack) 
"maintains that the notion of concrete truth depends on the 
notion of abstract truth, and cannot stand alone" (Haack, 1993, 
p. 202). It is an inevitable corollary of Rorty's Quinean-
Sellarsian holism that every sentence gets its meaning from 
the other sentences that appear with it in a context of dis-
course. The web of belief is not a mosaic with independent 
parts, so to understand how we think we must also under-
stand the patterns that govern how the web is woven, and the 
meta-patterns that interrelate those patterns. Consequently, 
to refrain from philosophizing is not an option, those who do 
not consciously philosophize are doomed to presupposing a 
philosophy. As Sellars said "We may philosophize for good 
or ill, but we must philosophize" (Sellars, 1975, p. 296). 
Dewey's Influence on Educational Theory 
Those of us who admire Dewey frequently wonder how 
such a profound and influential thinker could have disappeared 
so completely from the American philosophy curriculum. It 
is thus heartening to discover that there are places in Ameri-
can academia where Dewey's influence never faded. The read-
ers of this journal are well aware of the fact that Dewey's 
"Democracy and Education" is still widely read in graduate 
schools of education. And the people who read it are not aca-
demic philosophers who are interested in fined honed meta-
physical logic chopping for its own sake. They are people 
who want guidance on how to become good teachers and 
administrators, and they read this book because they find it 
helps them become better at the activity called teaching. 
And yet almost every chapter is filled with references to 
thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, or Hume, and to the 
grand metaphysical questions they struggled with. The main 
theme of the book is that this philosophical tradition has made 
fundamental errors in its conception of what knowledge is, 
which, naturally enough, interfere with a teacher's ability to 
impart knowledge to students. From Descartes, teachers 
inherited the idea that it was possible for the mind to learn 
without involving the body. From Hume, teachers inherited 
the idea that knowledge consisted of discrete bits of informa-
tion, and that learning consisted of stuffing those bits of 
information into the head. Dewey's alternative epistemology 
helps teachers to avoid those (and many other) errors, 
because it explains why they are errors. The fact that stu-
dents today do laboratory work, go on field trips, and do 
numerous other activities involving embodied experience, is 
almost entirely due to the influence of Dewey's epistemol-
ogy on contemporary educators. 
In other words, Democracy and Education concerns it-
self with the sorts of issues that Rorty criticizes academics 
for being too concerned with in his recent Achieving our 
Country. In Democracy and Education, Dewey does not "put 
a moratorium on theory" or "try to kick {the} the philosophy 
habit" (Rorty, 1998, p. 91). On the contrary, he provides 
detailed critiques of, and alternatives to, traditional episte-
mological theories such as the correspondence theory of truth. 
(Which Rorty claims a good pragmatist should simply 
ignore, ibid., p. 97). And yet Democracy and Education has 
managed to have exactly the sort of impact which Rorty has 
said such a book could never have. It has helped 
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non-philosophers become more skillful and effective in their 
daily activities, and it does so by talking about the implica-
tions of those epistemological assumptions which Rorty 
claims have no significant impact on real life. For how could 
anyone who teaches ignore the importance of the question 
"what is knowledge?" 
References 
Brandom, R. (2000). Rorty and his Critics. Basil Blackwell: 
Oxford. 
Dupre, J. (1993). The Disorder of Things. Harvard Univer-
sity Press: Cambridge. 
Baars, B. (1986). The Cognitive Revolution in Psychology. 
Guilford Press: New York. 
Haack, S. (1993). Evidence and Inquiry. Basil Blackwell: 
Oxford. 
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women Fire and Dangerous Things. Uni-
versity of Chicago Press: Chicago. 
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge UK. 
Putnam, H. (1990). Realism with a Human Face. Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of Pragmatism. University 
of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 
Rorty, R. (1993a). Holism, Intrinsicality, and the Ambition 
of Transcendence. In B. Dahlbom (Ed.), Dennett and his 
Critics. Basil Blackwell: Oxford 
Rorty, R. (1993b). Putnam and the Relativist Menace. The 
Journal of Philosophy, XC, 9 September. 
Rorty, R. (1994). Dewey between Hegel and Darwin. In D. 
Ross, Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences. Johns 
Hopkins: Baltimore. 
Rorty, R. (1998). Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in 
Twentieth-Century America. Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge. 
Saatkamp, H. J. (Ed.). (1995). Rorty and Pragmatism. 
Vanderbilt University Press: Nashville and London. 
Sellars, W. (1975). The Structure of Knowledge. In 
H-N.Castaneda (Ed.), Action, Knowledge, and Reality. 
Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis. 
Footnotes 
1 In his reply to Putnam, (Rorty, 1993) Rorty also asserts 
that he is not a philosophical revisionist either, despite 
Putnam's claim that this is what differentiates their positions. 
2 Perhaps Haack is acknowledging this fact when she says 
that Rorty's attacks on epistemology "would undermine not 
only epistemology, not only 'systematic' philosophy, but 
inquiry generally" (Haack, 1993, pp. 182-3). Haack, how-
ever, appears to be presenting this fact as a sort of reductio ad 
absurdum, and I do not know whether I agree with her about 
this. Lakoff and Dupre do not see these facts about language 
and biology to be cause for alarm, only for reform. My goal 
here is only to show that Rorty cannot consistently demand 
that epistemologists should change the subject when all other 
subjects are equally vulnerable to these criticisms. 
3 The removed section indicated by dots in the above quote 
adds the phrase "as part of SCIENCE" and the word 
"science" is italicized the first time it appears in the original 
quote. The italicized and the capitalized versions of "science" 
in the quote are technical terms in Haack's epistemology. She 
uses " 'science ' [in italics] for the disciplines ordinarily called 
'science' and SCIENCE for the broader usage, referring to 
"our empirical beliefs generally" (Haack, 1993, p. 123). Haack 
uses this distinction not only to make the point quoted above, 
but to criticize Quine for assuming that all SCIENCE must 
be science. (A criticism that applies equally accurately to 
Rorty.) Rorty obviously couldn't have dealt with Haack's 1993 
Evidence and Inquiry in any of his works cited here, all of 
which were written several years earlier. But the fact that 
Haack has now created a detai led and precise non-
foundationalist, non-a priori, epistemology is pretty good 
evidence (even for someone who doesn't agree with her 
theories) that there are still important things to be said about 
epistemology in an aposteriorist philosophy. 
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